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Abstract 
Extant scholarship has primarily tackled the MCAS Futenma base relocation case 
on Okinawa from specific scientific and economic disciplines, such as International 
Relations (IR) and Policymaking Studies. This paper. however. provides new 
research into the relationship between nationalism and localism, offering an original 
perspective that explains the combined interactive influences affecting the key issues. 
These include: the constraints and opportunities of the international system, the 
rhetoric used by political, commercial and societal stakeholders involved in policy 
direction, and the societal norms that embed shifting national and local interests into 
the policymaking process. 
Concretely, it e.tplicates to what extent intersecting key actors disputing the 
Futenma relocation issue on Okinawa adhere to Japans national norms of (US-
allied) bilateralism, (anti)militarism and developmentalism- and how policy is 
shaped in accordance with such. The research findings offer a deeper understanding 
of how Japan's domestic and foreign policies stem from the development and change 
of intersecting nationalist and localised discourses. 
The article focuses specifically on how nationalism is used as a means of 
articulating power in governance at local and national levels. Additional 
explanatory power is also provided through a refined explication of how nationalism 
itself undergoes processes of contestation in order to be utilized politically. Insights 
gained from the project provide an aid to policy creation and opposition in specific 
response to the pressing issues associated with construction of the new base at 
Henoko, as well as developing academic research beyond its established theoretical 
and empirical parameters. 
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Introduction 
This article examines the influences and impact of nationalism and localism in 
Okinawa. Primarily, it investigates and illustrates the salience of the former in 
relation to the latter. This includes not only examination of Okinawan nationalism, 
but also how the island's fate is framed by the nationalisms of Japan and the 
United States (US). The implications of these three interactive nations (albeit 
currently formed legally into only the two nation-states of Japan and the US) 
are examined through the case study of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 
(hereafter Futenma) relocation issue. The project's primary goals are to illuminate 
how the framing of national interests by Japanese and US state actors and agencies 
dictates the governance of Okinawa and to propose how Okinawan agency can be 
more effectively focused through policies that operationalise nationalism within 
the Ryukyu Islands. In this sense, the article's greatest value lies in its potential 
contribution towards finding a more effective way to galvanise local identity and 
foster a constructive form of grassroots nationalism from an Okinawan perspective. 
This offers a normative platform from which to implement greater power of self-
governance over issues such as the relocation, or unconditional return, of Futenma.1 
The meaning and influences of nationalism and localism in Okinawa are unusually 
complex. For despite the idea of political independence having gained little traction 
or popular support in the modem era (Takamine, 20 14; Meyer, 20 14; Nankuru-
gumi, 1996: 170), the former Ryukyu Kingdom, as it was, has a chequered history. 
It is one that combines periods of independence and acquiescence with cooperation 
in response to the surrounding great powers, as well as resistance to their authority. 
It has encompassed cultural distinction in addition to the prioritisation of economic 
interest. And the Ryukyu Islands sustain a powerful identity through discourses 
that are strikingly nationalistic in one sense. Yet, for the most part, such discourse 
represents not a political galvanisation of grassroots nationalism, but rather only 
a subnational local framing of Okinawan society. In the above sense, the Futenma 
relocation issue itself, in effect, embodies a three-way inter-state-sub-state dynamic 
between US, Japanese and Okinawan agency, in view of the fact that Okinawa is 
legally a local prefectural unit within the nation-state of Japan. 
Hence, the socio-political dynamics of how such a situation is governed are of great 
interest and have various potential implications for any number of inter-state-sub-
state examples within the international system, where localised national identities 
have unfulfilled potential to galvanise into a meaningful political force. This article 
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argues that Okinawa is one such case, but that the battle to prevent a new base 
being built to replace the existing facility at Futenma highlights both the potential 
and immediate impotence of Okinawan nationalism. It also underlines the relative 
power of American and mainland Japanese nationalisms in the policy arena- as 
well as explicating how they intersect to influence the process of local governance. 
Specifically, the synthesis of qualitative data sets analysed in this case suggests that, 
although the processes manifested within this three-way governance of the issues 
are contested and complex, the concept of nationalism is consistently central to the 
mainstream discourse and policy outcomes that emerge as a result of the interaction 
between state and sub-state agency. 
Contextualizing base politics 
Following official assimilation by Tokyo's Meiji rulers in 1879, and a lengthy 
period of discriminatory treatment (Namihira, 2014)- which arguably continues to 
this day (McCormack and Norimatsu, 2012: II4)- at the hands of Japanese state 
authorities, the Battle of Okinawa at the conclusion of World War II can be seen 
to have shaped modem Okinawan national identity more than any other historical 
event.2 Within the battle itself and the wartime years that preceded it, as well as the 
American occupation that succeeded it, the horrific abuse and destruction suffered 
by the Ryukyu people at the hands of both Japanese and American military was 
undoubtedly a key factor in fostering a narrative of national victimhood (Saki, 1976: 
II; NHK, 2006). 
In the succeeding period that followed, until reversion in 1972, a combination of 
military accidents and incidents caused by US forces and discrimination faced by 
those traveling to mainland Japan did little to alleviate this essential perspective 
(Hook, Mason and O'Shea, 2015: I59-226). Nevertheless, moves to foster 
grass-roots nationalism that focused on a separate national identity were limited 
(Sakurazawa, 2015: 381-96). This does not mean, however, that nationalism itself 
was not a central component in both the governance of Okinawa throughout that 
time and the development of contemporary identities for the Okinawan people. For 
example, nationalist rhetoric from Japanese state authorities and mainstream media 
relating to national security, as well as a localized societal sense of both inferiority 
and betrayal towards the mainland remain influential in terms of how issues such as 
US military facilities are framed and have influenced subsequent policy formation. 
In one sense, however, although the dominant contemporary discourses on issues 
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such as Futenma might suggest an indifference towards the historical legacies 
of Okinawan sovereignty that predate the Battle of Okinawa, this article argues, 
contrarily, that an understanding of national identity that can only credibly be 
described as stemming from historical nationalism is an important part of how 
such issues are problematized within the prefecture today. Such a claim is founded 
on the premise that the concept of consensual agreement, or goi, from the local 
people is critical to the central discourse and actions of those resisting construction 
of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) (Makishi and Sakihama, 2000; Save 
Henoko Action, 2014). It is argued below that (the lack of) goi in this context can 
be framed objectively in terms of a violation not just of environmental surroundings 
or current livelihoods, but also as part of the indirect denial of an autonomous 
Okinawan politico-historical identity. At present, issues such as the implementation 
of the proposed FRF at Henoko are predominantly framed by mainstream media 
and political actors as being focused upon the national interests of Japan, in spite 
of Okinawan opposition and resistance (Michishita, 2013 ). In order to counter such 
assumptions, this article applies an eclectic perspective to the existing understandings 
of the Futenma case - incorporating the combination of, and competition between, 
perceived Okinawan, (mainland) Japanese and American national interests on the 
Ryukyu Islands. 
Methodology and structure of the article 
In the sections that follow, nationalism is defined broadly in line with Ernest 
Gellner's functionalist definition, which stipulates how nationalism is, "primarily 
a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent", and that, ''nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires 
that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that 
ethnic boundaries within a given state ... should not separate the power-holders from 
the rest" (Gellner, 1983: 1 ). This definition of nationalism is adapted to the present 
article precisely because such a conception of the nation state is challenged by the 
sub-state socio-political reality of contemporary Okinawa Prefecture. In other words, 
it is the extent to which Okinawan society is in fact separated from its governing 
power-holders in Tokyo and Washington, in terms of its structures, agency and 
interests (driven by societal norms), that makes a standard application of nationalism 
theory problematic. In that sense, this article seeks to open up new ground by 
explaining how, even at the local level, nationalism can have a varied and dynamic 
influence on socio-political actors, as a function of their varying understandings of 
what constitutes national interest and how that should be prioritised. 
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In order to facilitate effective analysis of the issues outlined above, a broad range 
of mixed-media data sources are accessed and analysed. These are applied using 
a mixed-method approach, but focusing primarily on the qualitative analysis 
of discourse, which explains linguistically how the concept of nationalism 
impacts upon the processes of social norm creation and policy implementation in 
Okinawa. In this case, leading political, media and societal discourses relating to 
Okinawan governance and the specific issues surrounding Futenma are identified 
and assessed. These include: national and local political bodies and institutions 
(including interviews with political actors, independent experts and community 
representatives), in addition to a range of bibliographic materials and a comparative 
analysis of media, Diet, governmental and other literary sources. 
The above sources are examined chronologically via examples selected from 
discourse pertaining to: the 1995 rape of a 12-year old Okinawan girl by US marines; 
the 2004 crashing of a US military helicopter into Okinawa International University 
and the 2013 granting of permission for landfill at the proposed FRF site by former 
Prefectural Governor, Nakaima Hirokazu. Analysis of these cases equips the content 
with the necessary foundations to credibly explain how formal and informal political 
exchanges reflect and hold influence over policy direction (Hook, Mason and 
O'Shea, 2015: 1-18). This is combined with focused samples of coded quantitative 
data pertaining to the Futenma case in order to further ascertain the comparative 
influences of nationalism upon its outcome. 
Extant understandings of a tri-party structure 
In the extant literature, the ambiguity of the Ryukyu Islands' status and national 
identity has mostly been explained either as a function of structural factors of 
the international system (Mainichi Shimbun Seijibu, 2010; Michishita, 2013) or 
through the narrative of victimisation and protest (Arazato and Oshiro, 1969; Tanji, 
2006; Takahashi, 20 II; Matsumura, 20 IS). In the former case, Okinawan agency is 
essentially understood as responses that are shaped by the power struggles between 
surrounding great powers and their tactical interests. This includes being placed at 
the fulcrum of a historical regional rivalry between China and Japan in East Asia. It 
has also been portrayed as a function of strategic competition during the great wars 
of the 20th Century and, in the present era, as the focus point of a standoff between 
Japan, the US and China- a dynamic that encompasses a broader contest for power 
in the Asia Pacific (Hashimoto, Mochizuki and Takara, 20 I 0). 
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Within this, in the postwar context , Japan's central government have often done little 
more than acquiesce to the weight of US interests and pressures, or so-ca lled beiatsu, 
especia lly when this has been seen to f'it with an increasingly proactive nat ional 
security stance (McCormack, 2007). This results, it can be claimed. in skulduggery 
on the part of national-level officials and politicians in terms of interpreting when 
prior consultation should or should not be carried out with Okinawa ·s prefectu ral 
authorities and ci ti zens. As claimed by Gabe Masaaki, in the case of sec ret 
im portation o f nuclear weapons into Okinawan bases by An1erican fo rces, for 
example, ·'there is no doubt that Japan lied to the people" ( in Jimbo and M iyadai 
(eels), 20 I 0: 188).J There has, therefore, clearly been a high degree of deception 
and discrimination suffered by Okinawa under the tri-partite (US-Japan-Ok inawa) 
structure (see Figure 1.0) and limited abi lity to exercise local ized agency in its own 
governance. One of the most pressing questions in light of this mistreatment is. then. 
why there is such a lack of separatist nationalist sentiment. as represented by the 
fragmented response to Futenma 's relocation. within the prefecture. 
FIGU RE 1.0: Relative structural influences upon the FRF at Henoko 
(United States, J apan and Okinawa) 
Japan 
(Central gov., 
bureaucracy, secuxity 
L_:~~~~_jl:::::====~ forces etc) 
Key: Relative strength of influence : Strong .. ~ om ewhat stron Weak 
Debates on Okinawan independence have, however, been given a more practical 
vo ice in recent years by those seeking to achieve se lf-governance via a lega l 
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institutionalist approach. For example, Matsushima Yasukatsu (20 13: 32-7) has 
argued that Okinawa is effectively a colony of Japan (and the US) and as such can 
be legally decolonised via the pertaining decolonisation committees of the UN. With 
specific reference to the issues of self-defence and base maintenance, Matsushima 
advocates a complete removal of bases and the replacing of Okinawa's colonised 
administration with a status of pacifist neutrality - as comparable to a number of 
other small Pacific island states (20 13: 35). Under independent governance this, it is 
argued, could be implemented incrementally.'' 
Yet, although controversy remains over actions by the (US-pressured) Japanese 
government, Okinawa Defense Agency and other bureaucratic bodies in railroading 
construction of new bases and the deployment of dangerous US military hardware, 
including Osprey helicopters, the lack of active prefecture-wide opposition and 
grassroots support for independence are serious impediments to attaining greater 
self-determination (Ryukyu Shimpo, 4 June 2015: 2). Indeed, there is a heavy 
presence from outside the Ryukyu Islands of protesters against construction of the 
FRF (including many of those spot interviewed on-site at Henoko for this article). 
Such external anti-base support increases overall momentum for the anti-base 
movement, but in one sense dilutes the focus and political credibility that could 
be drawn upon from a more purely nationalist support base. Put simply, diluted or 
diversified political action from stakeholders involved in the FRF issue on Okinawa 
may prevent localised identity from re-crystallising around a collective Ryukyuan 
nationalism. Conversely, proportionally greater localised support would have 
the potential to gain in potency if then attached to specific issues, including base 
construction, return and relocation. 
Futenma is probably .. the World's most dangerous base" (NHK News, 21 September 
2014). Yet, analyses that present a case for there being an imbalance between 
national politics and localised support for its return or relocation outside the 
prefecture, also often fail to fully appreciate the considerable impact of political 
apathy within Okinawa. This is partly a function of demographic change and 
generational handovers of power - as Okinawa's youth are seen to be collectively 
apathetic. In this regard, apathy has further contributed to a decoupling of Okinawan 
identity from its potential agency to fuel nationalism. 
Nevertheless, as explicated by the Okinawa chiiki kagaku kenkyiijo, Okinawan 
cultural identity itself remains strong. This is supported by the analysis of opinion 
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poll data, as seen in the continuance of, "Okinawans having the strongest sense of 
prefectural identity in the whole country" and being, "the only prefecture to assign 
a particular linguistic distinction between the prefecture and those that live within 
it and the rest of Japanese society" (Okinawa chiiki kagaku kenkyiijo, 1997: 93-4). 
At the same time, however, this is combined with a culture of kindness, or yasashisa 
no bunka, that includes, "prioritising harmony with others rather than creating 
a relationship of opposition" (ibid., 1997: 90), as well as attempting to find an 
empathetic and inclusive form of responsibility for contentious issues. 
In addition, materialist- mostly realist- analyses of motivations for a suppression 
of Okinawan nationalism, point to the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
(hereafter Senkaku) Islands as a key factor (Izawa, 2011). Although there is some 
doubt as to the extent of resources under the Islands' seabed (Drifte, 2013: 11), in 
the international context of securing Japan's national interest, the Senkaku Islands 
offer a further justification for fortification of the Ryukyu Islands and the relocation, 
rather than outright return, of bases such as Futenma. This also serves to augment 
the prioritisation of Japanese national security above that of Okinawan self-
determination. 
Such literature has also countered liberal scholars, who have attempted to 
circumvent this state-centric approach by promoting a more developmental role for 
Okinawa, as the would-be legally assigned developers of any undersea resources 
that do fall within the Ryukyu 's historical territorial waters. Kinjo Hiroyuki, for 
example, argues that, this should not be made into a political struggle for governance 
over the (Senkaku] Islands between Japan, China and Taiwan ...... by supplying the 
surrounding countries, such as Japan, China, Taiwan and Korea, with the extracted 
oil and gas, [Okinawans] could improve their economies and standards of living. 
The energy from under the Senkakus could be developed by Okinawa with support 
from the government, and would be a perfect chance to shift to a more independent 
economy (2005: 8). 
The realist counter to this, though, posits that the surrounding powers would not 
permit Okinawan-led governance of such resources. In that sense, too, a more robust 
fostering of nationalism within the prefecture is needed to give greater hard-power 
support for liberal developmentalist theories of increased independence, moving 
them away from idealism and towards the formation of attainable public policies, 
informed by Okinawan agency. 
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Re-examining structure 
Structurally speaking, in relation to these extant arguments, the gravity of US 
domestic politics and its incentives in setting the direction of base-related policies 
on Okinawa should be reemphasized here (Sato, 2015: 233-43). In this sense, the 
enduring structure of US military bases on the Ryukyu Islands can be seen to have 
been set in place by the circumstances under which Okinawa reverted to mainland 
Japan in 1972. In the midst of the Vietnam War - which extensively utilized 
American bases in the prefecture to launch missions into the South East Asian 
conflict - the spiralling costs of operations meant that the US state was eager to find 
a way to reduce its expenditure into the region. This included abandoning the costly 
responsibility of administering and investing in Okinawa's civilian government. 
Japan's booming economy took up the slack in terms of financial support for 
Okinawa - including the so-called sympathy budget, or omoiyari yosan, which sees 
money transferred from Tokyo to Washington in order to subsidise the expenses of 
US military stationed in Japan. The US government also negotiated the continuation 
of post-reversion base operations to be sustained, keeping them now much as they 
were on Okinawa prior to the islands' legal return to Japan (Halperen, 2014; Sato, 
2015: 231-2). The imbalance of this US-dominated structural set-up, therefore, 
exacerbates the struggle between local interests and those of Japan's state authorities 
and mainland population. 
The balance of this power struggle has also shifted through time. Therein, the rift 
between mainland political and media actors and those on Okinawa, as well as local 
progressive and conservative factions, can be discerned effectively in reference to 
the collapse of Japan's political left. Indeed, as the few Okinawan nationalist parties 
that were active prior to reversion became subsumed thereafter into Japan's national 
left-leaning parties, Okinawa's nationalist voice was largely silenced. Yet, the glaring 
differential between Tokyo and Okinawa - as a function of structural dynamics - is 
illustrated by the central government's responses to politicized issues, such as the 
1995 gang rape of a primary school girl by three US Marines, largely accepted as the 
catalyst for agreeing Futenma's return (DiFilippo, 2002: 36-7). For example, then 
Foreign Minister Kono responded to the rape by echoing Okinawan Diet members 
in stating that, "I personally, honestly, feel that the base issues are causing a great 
deal of trouble for Okinawans .. .I believe that, as both have referred specifically to 
this issue in their Japan-US leaders' summit that both President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Murayama are conscious of these things" (Lower House, 27 March 1995). 
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Here, typically, the attempt to express heartfelt sympathy for Okinawans actually 
only reinforces the clear differentiation being made between the southernmost 
prefecture and all other areas of Japan. Okinawa is thereby named in place of more 
specific locales, such as cities or designated areas that are often specified elsewhere 
in precedence of an entire prefecture (Narita, Fukushima daiichi genpatsu, Northern 
Territories etc.). This difference in terminology is indicative of how Okinawa is 
represented from within, as well as outside, Japan as effectively embodying a distinct 
nation. 
Concomitantly, prior to the conclusion of the Cold War, issues relating to Futenma 
were predominantly raised by Okinawan lawmakers in the context of fighting to 
have land returned to Okinawa. However, Okinawan political actors at this time 
mostly utilized nationalism as a form of discourse that could be framed in the shape 
of US interests being inappropriately prioritised over those of Japan - rather than 
identifying Okinawa as a distinct national unit. This type of response was also 
present in reaction to later incidents that incited outrage from within the prefecture, 
though the expression of localised sentiment witnessed a degree of intensification 
and indignation towards Tokyo as well as Washington. Amidst this heightened 
sensitivity towards, and awareness of, problems being framed as specifically 
Okinawan, the precursors to broader debate on potentially greater socio-political, 
economic and administrative autonomy for Okinawa began to be crystalized around 
issues connected to Futenma 's relocation, starting with the rape case. 
Responses to the /995 gang rape 
Not only the rape of a 12-year old girl by US marines itself, but also the existing 
structural dynamics that were seen to have been symptomatic in it taking place 
- including the respective national responses to it - incited a particularly fervent 
reaction from within Okinawa. In line with the theoretical approach outlined at the 
start of this article, these sentiments of collective anger- at the violation of goi- and 
the resulting actions of protest were manifest through a force that can be compared 
to nationalism. Thereafter, while the rape incident accentuated the disparity between 
mainland Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, it also served as a major source of political 
capital that pressured the Japanese central government and US authorities into 
initially agreeing Futenma's complete return. 
In public response, however, the government's repeated referral to an emphasis on 
Japan-US relations in a separate context from those of Okinawan citizens is further 
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suggestive of an underlying understanding of Okinawa as in one sense an inherently 
distinct actor within the international structure - but at the same time subordinated 
to the national interests of Japan and the US. The US Department of State reinforced 
this position, which revolved around identifying the distinctive properties of 
Okinawa but also assigning strategies to aid its people as a seemingly charitable 
function of the US-Japan alliance. Critically, though, this did not include affording 
the Ryukyu Islands any extensive form of self-determination. As the Department's 
historical archives attest, to reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on 
the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the alliance, the two governments 
established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 1995. (Document 
XIV-3) Through the SACO process, the United States reduced its military footprint 
on Okinawa, without sacrificing operational readiness (US Department of State, 
200 I). The above example illuminates how initial responses to the horrific gang rape 
of a young girl by US servicemen created conditions that focused attention upon 
Okinawa's relevance to the international structure, but at the same time intensified 
US and Japanese resolve to supress the prefecture's ability to exercise any form of 
independent governance over related issues. 
Responses to the 2004 helicopter crash 
In terms of (re)confirming the triangular structural dynamic to nationalism in 
Okinawa, the crash landing of a US military helicopter into Okinawa International 
University in 2004 and the diverse responses to it additionally serve to highlight an 
apparent awareness of Okinawa Prefecture's separate identity from the rest of Japan. 
They are also suggestive of a tacit understanding of Okinawa's political significance 
in terms of how national interests derived from the nationalisms of the US and Japan 
are evidently seen to be decoupled from those of the Ryukyu Islands. 
In the case of Diet statements, from across the political spectrum, leading opposition 
(Democratic Party of Japan) responses were as illustrative of this structural 
awareness as their ruling party rivals'. For example, DPJ lawmaker, Wakai Yasuhiko 
made distinct reference to Okinawan citizens in his inquisition of the circumstances 
of the crash, identifying them as a separate unit of consideration. Before questioning 
how the crash signified the salience of issues surrounding Futenma, he stated that, 
"I for one feel a real sense of guilt and apology towards all the people of Okinawa 
Prefecture" (6 September 2004). LDP and bureaucratic statements similarly 
referred to Okinawa in isolation. This was contextualised within the efforts being 
made via the SACO between Japanese and US authorities to reduce the burden of 
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bases. Hence, even in the case of the 2004 helicopter crash, the disparity between 
a specifically distinct identification of Okinawa was juxtaposed with the concept 
of negotiation between Japan and the US. This included official discussions of 
governance and security that detennined the future of key US military facilities such 
as Futenma (MOFA, 2006a). 
Contrastingly, the US state response reinforced a subtle form of comparatively 
indifferent American nationalism, while at the same time echoing state responses 
from mainland Japan in terms of specifically identifying Okinawa as a separate 
and victimised entity. According to the US embassy's report, an official from 
the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa gave an account of the CH-53 
helicopter incident in which he stated that, "I would like to state up front my deepest 
regret over this accident and my regret for the anxiety it has caused the citizens 
of Okinawa" (Embassy of the United States, 2004). Having, then, first specified 
Okinawa as a single unit of analysis in response to US state action, he went on to 
portray the heroism of the American response and how combined US-Japanese 
actions coordinated their interests to good effect as a result. 
The interpretation of responses to the crash by Okinawan representatives at 
successive Diet sessions was also illustrative because it stressed not only how 
Okinawa was isolated by both the Japanese central government and US state actors, 
but also spotlighted the difference in socio-political temperature, or ondosa, which 
arises from the prefecture's precarious position within this triangular structure. 
Fonner Prefectural Governor, Ota Masahide (2000), for example, in one post-crash 
Diet session questioned how much the ruling administration even understood the 
relevant context of accidents on Okinawa and specifically at Futenma. 
Responses to Prefectural Governor Nakaimas 2013 granting of permission for landfill 
After being elected as Okinawa Prefectural Governor, with ruling LDP-Komeito 
backing, in 2006, Hirokazu Nakaima initially stood by his election pledge to see 
Futenma returned and its operational functions moved outside of the prefecture. 
These demands were also included in his public statements during the 2010 
gubernatorial elections. However, under pressure from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 
second administration, Nakaima announced in December 2013 that he had officially 
given pennission for landfill to pennit the proposed FRF at Henoko, as outlined 
under the SACO of 1996 and revised Roadmap of 2006. 
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The central government of Japan endorsed Nakaima 's actions using the rhetoric of 
Okinawans as unfortunate victims, on the one hand, but at the same time trumpeting 
the national interests of Japan, on the other. LDP spokesperson, Ishiba Shigeru, 
epitomized this stance by praising the governor and thanking "the efforts of so 
many Okinawans." lshiba then stated that, "in terms of securing a fixed point of 
deterrence within this area, with regards to the peace and security of our country and 
the Asia Pacific region, we have a responsibility to fulfil this as the nation of Japan" 
(28 January 2014). Here too, the promotion of nationalism articulated through a 
discourse of national interest and responsibility of the people was juxtaposed with 
the isolated and distinct actor of Okinawa. 
In contrast, the American governmental response was relatively low key, though 
welcoming of the decision, which effectively gave the green light to Abe's 
government to strengthen the US-Japan security alliance via construction of the 
new base at Henoko. At the same time, the US also reinforced a relationship with 
Okinawa resembling interstate relations. For instance, Ambassador John Roos made 
a high profile visit to Okinawa International University and exchanged symbolic 
state-level gifts with Okinawa PrefectureDrepresentatives (Embassy News, 15 May 
2013). 
In contrast, reaction of opposition Okinawan parliamentarians and local government 
actors reflected a localized rejection of Nakaima 's legitimacy, as the principle actor 
representing Okinawa (Moss, 2014). This in itself served to underscore the extent of 
latent nationalist sentiments, even without necessarily demanding political secession 
or any specific level of devolution from Tokyo. Such illustrates, though, the potential 
of localist agency that could serve to empower greater autonomy for Okinawa in the 
governance of its own key issues. 
These qualitative examples, then, of how Okinawa is identified differently as a 
distinct actor within the international structure of states illustrate clearly how 
multiple nationalisms serve to delineate the contested boundaries of governance. 
At the practical level, this determines to what extent local interests are included in 
the decision making process of designated security issues, such as the relocation of 
Futenma. The extent of distinction between Japanese national interests and those of 
Okinawa therein becomes pivotal. Okinawan nationalism has to be recognised as 
representing a stateless nation with unique ethnicity, common ancestral mythology, 
collective memory, shared multiplicity of cultural heritage and designated homelands 
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(Matsushima, 2012: 156-8, 2015). However, both the complexity of Okinawan 
identity and its contested ideology serve to dilute and complicate its ability to assert 
a more influential localized presence within the regional structure, which in this case 
is dominated by the great powers of Japan and the US. 
Identifying agency 
Within this structure mass-media offers a useful gage of relative agency. And as 
noted in at the state-level, media reactions to key events in the US, mainland Japan 
and Okinawa also showed clear disparities (Yamada, 2014: 47-50). These were 
further suggestive of how mainstream public discourse - and political approaches -
varied in each of the three locales. This included the framing of issues such as those 
pertaining to Futenma in a form that has caused severe socio-political divisions 
along nationalist (including Okinawa as a sub-national actor) lines. In this sense, 
leading newspaper coverage can be seen as reflective of the distinct nationalisms 
present in the US, Japanese mainland and the Ryukyu Islands. Specifically, it 
highlights the contrasting levels of political interest, public attention and direction 
of policy initiatives, as well as their uneven potential for realisation, depending upon 
the actual power of the primary decision makers involved. 
Media reaction to the 1995 rape case 
Japanese national newspapers and civil society groups were outspoken on this 
issue that ran to the heart of controversies over US stationing of military forces on 
Japan, and the disproportionate burden borne by a localised minority in Okinawa. 
News sources traditionally opposed to over-reliance upon the US-Japan Security 
Treaty, such as the Asahi Shimbun, seized upon this as an opportunity to criticise 
Japanese state actors in an attempt to shift policies away from acquiescence towards 
the US. Critically, however, the intensified framing of the US, Japan and Okinawa as 
separate entities was once again present across sectors (Asahi Shimbun, 18 October 
1995). 
Conversely, US nationwide news responses to the rape case, despite alluding 
to the heinous nature of the crime and the disproportionate burden suffered by 
Okinawans, remained largely devoid of any direct criticism of the American 
military presence on the islands in itself. In addition, in some cases attempts 
were made to qualify Okinawan objections towards US deployments on the 
grounds that not all those on the Ryukyu Islands want the bases removed and the 
behaviour of American soldiers has improved (New York Times, 8 October 1995). 
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In this regard, local media analyses of the 1995 gang-rape were actually surprisingly 
cautious. For example, in its aftennath, the Ryukyu Shimpo s political editors reacted 
to initial plans for relocation of bases such as Futenma in stark contrast to its current 
outspoken criticisms of US and Japanese plans for the FRF at Henoko. In response 
to then incoming Prefectural Governor, Inamine Keiichi 's, decision to "change 
course on base administration ... " and, "in contrast to former Governor, Ota['s], 
focus on a cooperative relationship with the national government" (Ryukyu Shimpo, 
17 December 1998), for example, no direct criticism was made of Inamine's move 
towards acceptance of relocating the base to Henoko. The Ryukyu Shimpo's coverage 
of the time largely limited critique to questioning the structural relationship between 
Japan and the US, and their disregard for local understanding and goi. 
Media reaction to the 2004 helicopter crash 
As evinced by the examples discussed above, the 2004 crash landing of a CH-
530 US military transport helicopter into Okinawa International University 
served as a major catalyst in galvanising opposition to the running of Futenma at 
its current location in Ginowan City (Yoshida, 20 l 0: l ). One important aspect of 
this was public and administrative outrage expressed via the media. Partly as a 
result of reactions articulated through news coverage, the proposals for the FRF 
were, eventually, fonnalised through the US-Japan Roadmap for (military force) 
Realignment Implementation, agreed two years later (Rice, Rumsfeld, Aso and 
Nukaga, 2006). Nevertheless, these plans included sacrificing not only the human 
security of Okinawans who would be put at risk as a function of the new base at 
Henoko possibly being targeted from overseas (Hoshino, 2009: 95-6), but also the 
local environment, by construction of a landfill facility that will undoubtedly damage 
the coral reef and fragile ecosystems upon which it is being built (Okinawa Daigaku 
Chiiki Kenkyujo, 20 12; Sakurai, 2009: 161-2). 
In this sense, both Okinawa's leading local papers exercised their agency in 
attempting to sway the public behind the combination of an anti-base position 
and a rejection of the FRF. However, while local newspaper coverage does have 
a societal impact, the perspectives of the Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo 
are well-know and nationally framed as stereotypically anti-base (Sakurai, Y., 
2013 ). This creates a contested influence, in as much as contrasting nationally 
distributed quality newspapers are also widely read within the prefecture. 
The inconsistency between national and local news sources thereby dilutes 
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localism and conftates how Japan's national interests and those of Okinawa are 
understood. 
While the nationally distributed Asahi Shimbun, for instance, clearly takes a 
supportive role of Okinawa's position, it does not make clear to what extent the 
interests of Okinawans over such issues should be entrusted to local agency and 
local government, as opposed to governance by centralized authorities in Tokyo. 
Less liberal national news sources have tended, including in the case of the 2004 
helicopter crash, to offer minimal recognition to separate Okinawan agency in this 
regard. Rather, local resistance and political action counter to American military 
interests is expressed from an overarching Japanese perspective. This often also 
assumes the subordination of Okinawan agency to the mainland and can be seen as 
indicative of a growing centralized Japanese nationalism. 5 
Contrastingly, and ironically, the more distant perspective of independent American 
quality news media offers in one sense a more balanced perspective, which though 
often lacking empathy with Okinawa, identifies the prefecture's independent 
agency.6 In fact, reports from some US newspapers even allude to the link between 
the issue of base operation and relocation, and the increased sense of regionalism 
felt within Okinawa. Limited attention is paid to issues on Okinawa by US sources, 
however, and references that are made primarily explain US interests, strategy and 
the circumstances of American personnel (Hateruma, 2015). For example, following 
the 2004 helicopter crash, the Washington Post (6 October 2004) and L.A. Times (13 
September 2004) both carried short pieces that alluded to local opposition, but failed 
to elaborate on Okinawa's current regional circumstances in detail. This broader 
indifference towards the Ryukyu Islands in fact, however, explicitly negated the 
agency of Okinawans as a distinct nation to a lesser extent than the bulk of mainland 
Japanese news sources did. 
Media reaction to Prefectural Governor Nakaimas 2013 approval oflandfi/1 
As with responses to the other key incidents covered above, the stark 
contrast between how local media actors in Okinawa and those of mainland 
Japan exercised politically motivated agency through discourse was evident 
across sources here. For instance, the Asahi Shimbzm maintained its highly 
sympathetic view of Okinawa, but, in contrast to Okinawan papers, framed 
the issue as clearly being primarily a matter for American and Japanese central 
authorities to deal with (Asahi Shimbrm, 28 December 2013). 
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Okinawa's two leading newspapers' reactions to Governor Nakaima's official signing 
of approval to allow landfi II for the construction of the FRF were staunch, combative 
and critical. This action by the prefectural governor was seen as a renege of his 
election campaign pledge to have the relocation made outside of the prefecture, and 
as a betrayal of the overwhelming wishes of the Okinawan people. Therein, local 
newspapers drew upon an increasing sense of ethnic identity (Yoshikawa, 2014) that 
could be described as (Ryukyu) nationalism (Matsushima, 2012) in order to insight 
opposition from within the islands. In one of the Ryukyu Shimpo's final editorials 
of 2013, for instance, this was first enacted via a depiction of Okinawa as having 
once again been humiliated, suggesting that, "if the year can be summed up by one 
Chinese character for Okinawa, is it not the one which means 'humiliation'? This 
was made paramount by Governor Nakaima's 'insult' ...... [i]n going against his 
election manifesto" (Ryukyu Shimpo, 30 December 20 13). 
In contrast to the disproportionate agency assigned to Tokyo's central government 
and Okinawan authorities, respectively, by national newspapers and local media 
sources, once again independent US news agencies offered a different perspective, 
suggestive of their own forms of underlying nationalism. Ultimately, the tone of 
most major quality American newspapers was one of ideologically detached US-led 
agency having dictated the outcome of the FRF via Nakaima's decision to approve 
the landfill at Henoko. Nevertheless, local agency and the independent resistance of 
Okinawa as a separate entity was for the most part clearly stated once again, and in 
some regards recurrently given greater recognition than throughout the better part of 
Japanese press coverage (New York Times, 27 December 2013; Washington Post, 27 
December 20 13). 
Quantitative assessment of media i1ljluences 
In combination with the qualitative examples elaborated upon above, a brief 
statistical analysis of the weighting of news media sources responding to base-
related issues is also indicative of the degree of nationalist sentiment that is active 
within a locale during a designated period of time (Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos 
and Armenakis, 1999: 31-6), i.e. Okinawa. The contrast between different media 
organizations, particularly those from mainland Japan and Okinawa, also suggests 
that the framing of national interests- though differently defined by each- is 
critical in so far as contested national causes are promoted as being pivotal to 
the issues surrounding Futenma's proposed relocation. As seen from Figure 1.1., 
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below. the quantity of coverage assigned to Futenma by local newspapers has risen 
exponentially in the period since the gang rape of 1995 and the subsequent incidents, 
analysed qualitative ly above. This contrasts with the changes in vo lume of coverage 
on the same topic from the leading national news med ia sources. which have 
witnessed steady but comparatively modest increases. The aggrandized interest from 
local news organisations can there fore be understood to have arisen as it became 
more central to the current mainstream of public di scourse and soc io-politica l 
sentiment within Okinawa. 
Combined agency of polilical and marke1 inleresls 
Supersed ing media influence. large sec tio ns of the marke t and po liti ca l 
administration o f Okinawa are heavily inOuenced by bureaucratic agencies, directed 
as offshoots o f central government. In this sense. the we ight o f age ncy held by 
bodies such as the Cabinet Offi ce's Okinawa General Bureau. Okinawa Defense 
Bureau and Ministry of Fore ign Affairs Okinawa Offi ce is also substantial and 
each can be seen as severely limited in terms of meaningful input from loca lised 
Okinawan authorities and actors (Okubo. 2009: 29-30).7 Furthermore. particularly 
under the LOP's reinvigorated adm inistration. Jed by PM Abe. these bureaucratic 
bodies. politicians from central government and large corporations. including base-
constru ction companies, have reinfo rced the tradit ional post-War Japanese iron 
triangle (Stockwin , 2008: Col ignon and Usui . 200 I) in thei r governance of the 
prefecture and key issues such as Futenma ·s relocation. 
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The power of government-run agencies therefore severely restricts the ability of 
local authorities, political actors and market enterprises to harness ideologically 
based movements. This means that those stemming from grassroots nationalism 
cannot transfer their political will into a restructuring of how the prefecture is 
governed. The salience of this for issues such as the construction of the FRF should 
therefore be clear. For example, the iron triangle- in the form of public-private 
collusion- is perhaps most commonly associated with the construction (concrete 
and gravel) industry in Okinawa, which is central to reclaiming land for new base 
construction. In addition, the recent employment of private security firm, Alsok, used 
in combination with the police to prevent protestors from impeding the initiation of 
boring surveys and construction at Henoko, further serves as a graphic illustration of 
the extending power of combined state and market-based forces across a wide range 
of sectors, including national security (Fuse, 2014 ). 
Identifying the power of norms 
The pervasive influences of ascribed national interest can also be seen in the 
construction and perpetuation of social norms, which are multi-fold, outside and 
within Okinawan society. From the Okinawan side they include historical norms 
of socioeconomic exchange and inclusivity. And these can in effect be linked to 
national identities of the pre-modern Ryukyu Kingdom and, more temporally, the 
entrenched norm of antimilitarism in specific response to Okinawa's wartime horrors 
of the 20th Century, as well as the ongoing military occupation - as represented by 
the proposed FRF and other US bases. 
Such norms have more recently come into intensified cross-interaction with the 
globalized trends associated with market capitalist neoliberalism in the present era. 
One critical factor, in part as a function of neoliberalism's social proliferation,. has 
been the impact of its resulting atomised consumerist culture. For example, this 
has led to the prioritising of socioeconomic norms stemming from commercialised 
individualism, which have resulted from the global implementation of neoliberal 
reforms (Beck and Grande, 20 I 0; Harvey, 2005), and has contributed to the spread 
of political apathy among Okinawa's youth population.8 This trend can be contrasted 
with historical norms to illustrate a critical shift. 
Japanese norms and the governance of Futenma 
In the eras that preceded World War II, the Ryukyu Islands were subjected to 
the brutal expansionism of Japanese nationalism first-hand, having been forcibly 
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subdued by Meji Era colonisation in the late l9'h Century and militarism in the 
early 20th Century. These subjugations of the Ryukyus witnessed the extensive 
rejection and suppression of Ryukyuan identity by Japan's central authorities. 
Thereafter, in the wake of defeat at the end of World War II and socio-political 
restructuring initiated under US rule, the Japanese state has predominantly attempted 
to incorporate Okinawan issues, including those relating to US bases, within a 
state-centric worldview that is directed primarily by the norms of (US aligned) 
bilateralism and economic developmental ism (Hook et al, 20 II). These have largely 
endured throughout the postwar era, up to the present. 
As a result of this, nationalist Okinawan norms have continued to be assimilated into 
those of Japan as a whole, as seen tangibly in the promotion of commercial interests 
through the national designation of Special Economic Zones on the islands (JETRO, 
20 14), nationally framed geopolitical security concerns (Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute 
etc.) and the active promotion of regional identity, such as depicted in Okinawan 
popular and traditional culture (MOFA, 2011). All of these initiatives have allowed 
the Japanese state and, more broadly, Japan's mainland population as a whole 
to successfully incorporate most aspects of Okinawan nationalism into a wider 
national framing, which now promotes cultural diversity as well as endorsing ethnic 
uniformity. 
The impact of nationally-embedded norms emanating from the US and Japan, which 
influence Okinawa's governance, also remains immense. The outcome, in terms of 
ideologically underpinned policies that dictate the critical state of military bases 
on the islands, is a complex set of socio-political and socio-economic interests 
manifest within the prefecture that have complicated multiple issues as a result. 
These cut across individual, social and party lines, as well as those of the market. 
This myriad of often conflicting normative ideals and interests also, therefore, 
dilutes the galvanising of one single form of Okinawan nationalism as, for example, 
mercantilism competes with anti-militarism. 
Amid this, one of the most pivotal factors on Okinawa itself is the differentiation 
between cultural nationalism (based on a shared sense of cultural identity) and 
political nationalism that promotes greater self-determination in governance. As 
one American social scientist specialising in Japanese Studies argued, " ... how 
the Okinawans feel about their island as a psychological study based on cultural 
nationalism might be interesting, but not political nationalism. They are so easy 
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to buy-off, or at least anyone with any power in Okinawa is!" (DIJ SSSG, 2014). 
The rather crude connotations of this statement illustrate the nature of a number 
of competing norms that exist in Okinawa. These act overall as a hindrance in 
operationalizing a more uniformly directed form of localised political agency- such 
as that driven by grassroots nationalism. 
Passive (less actively articulated) norms also play an instrumental role in shaping 
the direction and intensity of nationalism as a force within the prefecture and its 
ability to penetrate the policy sphere. Once again, political apathy is a critical 
aspect of this, as illustrated by the year-on-year decline in election turnouts within 
Okinawa (Nakamoto, 2014: 173; Okinawa Times, 15 December 2014). In this 
regard, generational and demographic changes are central factors in intensifying the 
problem of undermined local governance and weakening nationalism as a normative 
democratic force (Sato, 20 15). Younger generations of Okinawans not only suffer 
from political apathy but also knowledge-deficit and indifference with regards 
to issues that might serve to galvanise nationalistic sentiments within Okinawa. 
The case of ill-informed and under-educated (particularly on local historical 
issues) university students across the prefecture, for instance, is illustrative of how 
knowledge that pertains to Okinawan concerns has not been preserved or effectively 
promoted in recent decades (Sato, 2014; on-site author interviews with students from 
multiple Okinawan universities, 2014). 
The instrumentalization of active (more explicitly articulated) norms, conversely, 
can be equally misdirected, as politicians, business leaders and bureaucrats are 
incentivised by lucrative contracts (Ryukyu Shimpo, 24 October 1996; Nagata-
cho I bun, 20 I 0), promotions or votes (Moriya, 201 0). In respect to this kind of 
instrumentalism, this article has spotlighted Nakaima Hirokazu's reneged promise 
to resist the relocation of Futenma within the prefecture. Conversely, successive 
Governor, Onaga Takeshi, based his 2014 gubernatorial election campaign on the 
platform of a united identity bridging ideological divides, or "all Okinawa", against 
the in-prefecture relocation of Futenma, which in previous years he had refused to 
officially resist or reject as a possible policy option (Yaeyama Nippo, 3 November 
2014). In other words, despite his anti-base rhetoric, Onaga can be seen to have 
instrumentalised the norm of anti-base sentiment and movements against Futenma's 
relocation to Henoko as a means to galvanise local support by way of acquired votes. 
In that sense, he has successfully decoupled his own political motives from the 
rhetoric he espouses, but the resulting policies become largely circumstantial. 
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Norms and policy implementation in Okinawa 
A combination of US-led norms that promote the sustained projection of geo-
strategic regional power, combined with an increasingly nationalistic Japanese 
central government, have been central in enforcing construction of the new base at 
Henoko. This trend has been manifest in concrete policies formulated by the US 
Department of State and Department of Defense. For example, following revision 
of the US-Japan Guidelines in 2015, enhanced military interoperability has been 
realised, based on the ideals of "seamless, robust, flexible and effective bilateral 
responses" (Russel, 2014) taken in cooperation with Japan. The technical details 
of this are outlined in the pertaining mid-term report commissioned by the two 
governments (US Department of Defense, 2013: 3-4), but needless to say this 
effectively endorses the proposed FRF at Henoko and the Marines that are set to 
be deployed there - undergirded by new guidelines which cement the politics of 
aligned nationalism in terms of power projections from Washington and Tokyo. In 
other words, US-sourced norms of neorealism, dressed in the discourse and framing 
of bilateralism with Japan and regional security, inform a policy of continued 
interventionism in, increased military focus upon, and rebalancing - or so called 
"pivot"- towards Asia (Manyin et al., 2012: 1). These leave Okinawa's local 
governance in a highly vulnerable position when viewed primarily by the American 
state as a function of adherence to these norms. 
Japan's MOFA, on the other hand, have also consistently exhibited severe 
discrepancies between a discourse that panders to norms of local prioritisation 
(e.g. reduction of the disproportionate military burden placed on Okinawa) and 
bilateralism, but appears mostly only to enact policies based on the latter. These are 
similarly implemented predominantly in the name of protecting national security 
and regional stability, in cooperation with the US. For instance, in the US-Japan 
Roadmap for Realignment Implementation of2006, Joint Statement ofthe US-Japan 
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) of 2010 and Japan-US Foreign Ministers 
Meeting (Summary) of 2014, bilateral cooperation was placed high on the agenda, 
and in each case complimented by justification for policy implementations such as 
the FRF being built at Henoko, on the grounds that this will reduce the burden on 
Okinawa (MOFA 2006, 2010, 2014). 
In spite of this, a number of concrete policies promised in the Roadmap which 
would actually have put this narrative of burden reduction into practise, such as the 
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partial or complete return of six US bases (MOFA, 2006), including Futenma, have 
not been implemented. Rather, the Japanese government has been seen, in the form 
of joint military exercises, integration of security systems, and sharing of equipment 
and information - not to mention the increased fortification of outlying islands -
to have implemented policies based on US-led bilateralism, largely in disregard of 
Okinawa's actual burden. 
This discrepancy between norms seemingly supporting Japanese nationalism 
and those, espoused but largely un-enacted, to prioritize human security in the 
locality of Okinawa, present a key area of contestation to be addressed by those 
opposing Futenma's relocation to Henoko. If this structural normative dynamic is 
not countered and effectively publicised from within the prefecture, as being an 
ongoing misrepresentation of political discourse versus actual policy, then Tokyo's 
bureaucracy and executive will surely ram-through construction of the landfill and 
claim that proper consultation and incorporation of local sentiments have been 
carried out - and that goi had been received. 
A unified understanding of Okinawan nationalism and its tributary norms is key 
in this regard, in so far as it creates one voice for the prefecture, as a stateless 
nation. However, it is in fact the pluralism and factional nature of norms pervading 
Okinawan politics and society that brings into question the credibility of Okinawan 
nationalism as a meaningful construct at all in the present era. At one demonstration 
held in front of the Prefectural Government building in Naha, for example, on-
site interviews could be conducted simultaneously with those from as diverse 
interest groups as: extremist Christians, new leftists, local government candidates, 
pensioners' groups and women's groups (on-site interviews, kencho hOi daikodo, 9 
October 2014). In this sense, any form of nationalism in Okinawa that might hope 
to counter a particular issue, such as the FRF, faces the longer-term challenge of 
unifying a disparate set of actors who lack a clearly directed normative voice around 
which to focus policies for the benefit of all Okinawans. 
Conclusion: Empowering nationalism on Okinawa 
In essence, a combination of state-embedded, market-based media and societal 
forms of nationalism manifest within the US, Japanese mainland and Okinawa have 
interacted to substantially affect how the attempted relocation of the Futenma base 
from Ginowan to Henoko has been delayed and executed. The findings of this paper 
suggest that these interactive forms of nationalism will continue to exert considerable 
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influence over the processes involved. Within this, the nationally espoused Japanese 
social and economic norms of antimilitarism and developmental ism have served only 
as a highly limited break on policies oriented to American military base construction 
and maintenance on Okinawa. 
US policy in this sphere stems itself, in precedence, from nationalist norms of 
realist-based geopolitical power acquisition and the retention of hegemonic control 
over the Asia Pacific region, predicated on a firm security alliance with Japan. 
Tokyo, too, utilizes this alliance, as made particularly evident under the current 
Abe administration, in order to promote a more proactively nationalist security 
agenda. Hence, ultimately, American foreign policy interests and Japanese central 
government-led governance over sites within Okinawa have remained largely aligned 
throughout the postwar and post-Cold War eras. This has meant that opposition to 
base construction, as of the proposed FRF at Henoko, has been in need of a better 
coordinated Okinawan nationalism (or at least activism) in order to more effectively 
counter the portrayed national security interests overseen by the US and Japan. 
It is evident from the broad range of qualitative samples gathered here from across 
sectors in Okinawa that such activism, at both prefectural and societal levels, 
has been limited. Nationalism has, therefore, failed to galvanise into a coherent 
form of localised political power on Okinawa. This has been shown to be the 
result of weakness and acquiescence in political leadership - as in the cases of 
former Governor, Nakaima- as well as a convergence of interests between local 
and national political, bureaucratic and market actors that essentially approve the 
continuation of the status quo, and hence the approval of existing plans, such as for 
the new base to be constructed at Henoko. In response to this, the inability of local 
political, social and commercial media actors opposed to the plans to affect greater 
change can be seen to be exacerbated by internal divisions and political apathy -
particularly among poorly informed younger generations ofOkinawans. 
In order to overcome these combined problems of structural rigidity and weakness 
of agency on Okinawa, at least three factors will have to change, or be shifted in 
a favourable direction, if greater self-determination is to be realised. Firstly, the 
currently elected Diet members and prefectural governor must work effectively 
together under the banner of "all Okinawa", or an equivalent ideological consensus, 
in order to maximise all possible avenues of political opposition to both central 
government and US military directives that run counter to the majority of Okinawan 
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sentiment and public opinion.9 Secondly, the Okinawan population must be better 
educated on the history and evolution of the Ryukyu Islands' governance. This is 
likely to require a more specific focus on national identity within formal education, 
in addition to the expansion of initiatives that promote the preservation of Okinawa's 
cultural heritage and pristine marine environment. Finally, key market actors (for 
example, in construction and tourism industries), other than those already endorsing 
greater self-governance in the media, need to be engaged and persuaded that the most 
profitable and affluent future for this potential-rich locale lies in an increased sense 
of Okinawan-brand national identity, greater economic and political independence, 
and a reduction in the number and scale of US bases. If all of these conditions are 
met, then the empowering ofOkinawan nationalism may be realised- rising dragon-
like from the ashes of the former Ryukyu Kingdom. 
[Notes] 
1 The terms 'relocation' and 'replacement' are highly controversial in this context because, in effect, 
what is being planned off-shore ofHenoko is a new base designed to incorporate and opcrationalize 
a number of the US military's new military technologies. The size and location arcalso based 
approximately on the 1966 design for an additional facility that was never realised (McCormack and 
Norimatsu, 2012: 106). This article uses the term 'Futenma Replacement Facility' (FRF) intermittently 
with 'new base' due to its widespread and generally accepted usage within, and in reference to, 
Okinawa. 
2 In contrast to this work, a substantial body of scholarship deals with Okinawa's postwar history of 
nationalism purely from the perspectives of independence-movements per se and/or post-colonialism. 
For discussion, see works by, amongst others, Takara Ben, Arasaki Moriteru, and Arakawa Akira. 
3 The authors also highlight how this has allowed the return of the Futenma site to be transformed into a 
relocation (within the prefecture)- illustrated by the tenuous links between Futcnma and the 
designated relocation site at Henoko (2010: 7-13). 
4 Matsushima's proposals for an institutionalised route to Okinawan independence could be preceded, 
posits Taira Chosei (2013: 37-41), by the implementation of a new form of localised government on 
Okinawa that would assign it a status as a special region within Japan's so-called toc/ofuken system, 
for example as the semi-autonomous unit of"Okinawa-shii." 
5 More traditionally conservative news media sources, such as the Yomiuri Shimbun responded to 
the crash primarily as an issue of US-Japan relations. In this sense, while mention of then Prefectural 
Governor, lnamine Keiichi's, demands was made, little reference was made to the abrogation of 
Okinawan agency per se, or to the prefecture as representing anything other than a standard regional 
unit within the political body of Japan (Yomiuri Shimbmr, 26 August 2004). 
6 This is in contrast to US security strategy and its policymaking process with regards to Okinawa, 
which has seen the Islands dealt with almost entirely as function of American geo-military and 
economic interests, with Henoko being trumpeted publically as a comparatively (to Futenma's current 
location in Ginowan City) safe option as far as human security goes (Kawana and Saito, 2015). 
7 The Cabinet Office Okinawa General Bureau is responsible for a huge number of activities relating 
to infrastructure and construction which involve the appropriation of public funds to commercial 
companies in order for projects to be undertaken (Okinawa General Bureau, 2014). Reform,abolition 
of, or greater local control over, these bureaus therefore offers the potential for increased agency over 
land usage, including base construction and relocation. 
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8 The focus on individual patterns of consumption, self-image and localised social networks replaces an 
interest in broader societal and political issues. 
9 Despite common rejection ofthe proposals for the construction of a new base at Henoko, the division 
of party interests between the prefecture's political representatives is seen as a potential challenge in 
this regard. Prefectural Governor, Onaga Takeshi, hails from the LOP, with Akamine Seiken (Japanese 
Communist Party), Teruya Kantoku (Social Democratic Party), Tamaki Denny (People's Life Party) 
and Nakasato Toshinobu (independent) making up the four proportionally represented Okinawan 
parliamentary Diet seats. 
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